Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Gouri Suresh
Coincidental segregation is a prevalent issue today. For example, schools often find themselves effectively segregated simply because alike people live in neighborhoods together. This has led to rifts in understanding between many subsets of society and income gaps between upper and lower echelons. This rift has led to established institutions in districts that appeal to the majority of the population in the district. For example, the shops on the side of Main Street differ from the shops on street in a Charlotte suburb. The atmospheres of these districts have sway in where individuals live even if they are indifferent as to who their neighbors are. On multiple occasions, the government has attempted to relegate the effects of this segregation in the form of bussing campaigns and targeted housing plans.
In this model, I represent third party meddling such as these campaigns and how it affects the ghetto rate cluster size of a society. I created a matrix of agents overlaid by a five-by-five grid denoting 25 districts. I create agents that are indifferent to their neighbors, but favor moves to districts with alike atmospheres. I test three different scenarios of the district model: one where the third party does not act, one where the program moves unhappy agents to the most diverse region, and one where the third party moves an unhappy agent to the region with the most opposite agents. I compare each of these simulations’ segregation indicators with those of the initial Schelling model. I find that districts left untouched by a third party increase the segregation rate of a society. Additionally, the program indicates that a society with districts and third-party influence yields lower segregation rates than the initial Schelling model without districts. Therefore, if left untouched drawing districts of populations segregates the society more than before. However, if manipulated effectively, district lines lead to a more integrated society.