

# PERCEPTION, REALITY, & INSTITUTIONS: DECODING SUPPORT FOR FAR RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE



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## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What factors influence an individual's likelihood to vote for far right populist parties in Europe?
- What electoral structures facilitate that success?
- Do these influences differ between elections for national legislatures and those for the European Parliament?

## PREVIOUS LITERATURE

- Arzheimer & Carter 2006 – Accounting for both Individual & Contextual Measures of Aggregate Support
- Arzheimer 2009 – Supply-Side Structures of Political Opportunity
- Carter 2011 – Integrated Supply & Demand Framework
  - Political Opportunity
  - Electoral Structure
  - Internal Party Dynamics
  - Electoral Law
- Golder 2016 – Demand-Side Determinants of Support M
  - Modernization, Economic & Cultural Grievances
  - Grievances mutually reinforce/interact with one another

## DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL FAR RIGHT PARTIES (MULTILEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSION)\*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Demand - Actual (Limited)	Demand - Actual (Full)	Demand - Actual & Perceived Support for National Far Right Party (Y=1)	Supply Only	Supply & Demand	Supply & Demand Interactions
<b>VARIABLES</b>						
<b>Demand-Side - Actual (Country)</b>						
Urban Population (%)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.007)		-0.014*** (0.004)	-0.007* (0.004)
Unemployment Rate (%) * Number of Migrants/year						-0.003*** (0.001)
<b>Demand-Side - Perceived (Individual)</b>						
Modernization Grievance (Y=1)			0.144*** (0.052)		0.147*** (0.052)	0.146* (0.088)
Economic Grievance (Y=1)			0.260*** (0.047)		0.269*** (0.047)	0.270*** (0.057)
Cultural Grievance (Y=1)			0.635*** (0.071)		0.637*** (0.071)	0.590*** (0.116)
<b>Supply-Side (Country)</b>						
Far Right Seat Share				0.007* (0.004)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Far Right Parliamentary Seat Share				-0.008 (0.008)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.008** (0.004)
<b>Electoral Fractionalization</b>				34.904*** (10.827)	42.519*** (7.118)	-47.210*** (7.005)
<b>Legislative Fractionalization</b>				30.813*** (10.926)	46.055*** (7.249)	46.564*** (6.844)
<b>Prop. Rep.</b>				1.494 (1.962)	-3.956** (1.718)	-2.057 (1.693)
<b>Individual Controls</b>						
Years of Ed	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.006)	-0.028*** (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.006)	-0.027*** (0.006)
Female (Y=1)	-0.320*** (0.043)	-0.321*** (0.043)	-0.316*** (0.043)	-0.316*** (0.043)	-0.313*** (0.043)	-0.312*** (0.043)
Student (Y=1)	-0.249** (0.105)	-0.250** (0.105)	-0.251** (0.105)	-0.247** (0.105)	-0.251** (0.105)	-0.250** (0.105)
<b>Country Controls</b>						
Post-Communist (Y=1)	-5.003*** (1.197)	-4.989*** (0.755)	-4.989*** (0.801)	-2.143 (1.755)	-1.389 (0.854)	-1.233 (0.773)
Real GDP Growth Rate (%)	-0.159** (0.064)	-0.001 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.049)	-0.042 (0.030)	0.048** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.018)
<b>Constant</b>	1.496*** (0.128)	1.017*** (0.124)	1.076*** (0.123)	0.729*** (0.137)	-0.107 (0.136)	-0.234* (0.135)
Observations	64,210	55,026	55,026	64,210	55,026	55,026
Number of groups	47	38	38	47	38	38
Wald chi2	122	138.4	242.8	284.7	762.9	896.3

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.10  
 \*Only variables that achieved statistical significance in at least one model were included in this table subset

## DATA

1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file	University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill	Surveys which examine party positioning on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties across European countries. Includes questions on general party positioning, EU policies, party spectrum position, economic and social positions, as well as other non-EU policy issues.
Comparative Political Science Dataset	Comparative Political Science Dataset	Includes political and institutional data assembled by Klaus Armingeon and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation for 36 democratic OECD and/or EU member-countries for 1960 to 2014.
Eurobarometer	European Commission	Representative samples of approximately 1000 individuals (age 15+) per country from four Standard Eurobarometer surveys including 61.0 from February–March 2004, 69.2 from March – May 2008, 71.1 from January–February 2009, and 71.3 from June – July 2009 across all 28 European Union member states

## THEORY & EXPECTATIONS

- Hypothesis 1:** Communities experiencing multiple grievances simultaneously will experience more support for far right parties.
- Hypothesis 2:** Higher perceived grievances will be more strongly associated with support for far right parties on the individual level than objective measures of those grievances.
- Hypothesis 3:** Factors that determine political opportunity, such as legislative fractionalization, will be the most significant determinants of electoral success of far right parties.
- Hypothesis 4:** Countries that use regional lists to elect MEPs will have higher success rates for far right parties than those that use national lists to elect MEPs in European elections.

## RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL FAR RIGHT PARTIES

Magnitudes of Maximum Effect on Individual Support for National Far Right Party




Figure 1: Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Individual Support for National Far Right Parties (author's calculations based off Model 6, Table 1)

Magnitudes of Maximum Effect on Country Support for National Far Right Parties




Figure 3: Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Country Support for National Far Right Parties (author's calculations based off Model 6, Table 1)

Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Individual Support for Far Right Parties in EP Elections




Figure 2: Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Individual Support for Far Right Parties in EP Elections (author's calculations based off Model 6, Table 2)

Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Country Support for Far Right Parties in EP Elections




Figure 4: Magnitude of Maximum Effect on Country Support for National Far Right Parties in EP Elections (author's calculations based off Model 6, Table 2)

## LIMITATIONS

- Data Limitations: Only 2004, 2008 and 2009 EB surveys were available. Other data for 2010, 2012, and 2016 "under embargo"
- Operationalization of Perceived Explanatory Variables: based on questions available in EB surveys - can change between
- Simultaneity: supply & demand mutually reinforce one another

## CONCLUSIONS

- Perceived grievance is a far more important predictor of support on the individual level than the country-level measurements of these grievances.
  - Cultural grievance increases support for the far right by 14.8 percent in national and 21.1 percent in supranational elections.
- Political opportunity – as measured by legislative and electoral fractionalization – was the highest single predictor for support for a far right party on the country level.
  - Moving from a very low to very high degree of legislative fractionalization increased support for far right by 11.6 percent.
  - Moving from a very low to very high degree of electoral fractionalization decreased support for far right by 11.8 percent.
- Little evidence emerged that interaction effects between different types of grievances were statistically significant amplifiers of support for far right parties.
- Countries that use a regional list system over a country list for EU elections were not statistically more likely to support the far right
- Individual- and country-level controls were in expected directions.

## FUTURE WORK

- Update through 2016, including 2014 EU elections
- Analysis of "protest vote" in EU vs. national elections
- Individual politician support (Marine Le Pen – FN, Geert Wilders – PVV, Viktor Orbán - Fidesz)
- Motivations of perception & policy influence

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